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Roman Emperor
The United States has been actively engaged in major contingencies abroad for more than ten years. The military force involved includes both the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). As this era of major conflict draws to a close, the nation's civilian and military leadership must determine an appropriate, affordable force structure by which the US will prepare itself for an uncertain future in its role as a world leader. The RC, including both the nation's National Guard and Reserve forces, builds capacity for the military enterprise. It does so at a fraction of the overall cost of the AC, often cross-utilizing civilian skills in military jobs with the same ultimate readiness levels as their active teammates. In a fiscally constrained environment, force structure decisions reside on a fulcrum where perfect balance is difficult to achieve, yet still essential. Reversibility is an effective concept the US can use to achieve that precious balance in defense force structure.
Defense Strategic Guidance
Reversibility is a term with multiple meanings; thus, it is easily miscommunicated in either send or receive mode. The term has been used in a reactive context, such as reversing budget decisions, and also as an implication that government decisions are tentative or have the potential to require quick program reversals. 2 The context presented in this paper is related to intentional programming decisions and is defined in the 2012 Defense strategic guidance:
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We have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of "reversibility"-including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis -is a key part of our decision calculus. 3 Simply put, US strategic leaders must make tough choices between essential manpower or material programs yet retain the ability to regenerate to deal with changes in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) environment. 4 Reversibility, when acted upon, is in reaction to changes in the VUCA environment; however, strategic leaders must maintain an intentional focus on preserving the capability to reverse as opposed to relying completely on ad hoc measures which are reactive and unplanned.
The AC/RC balance is an aspect of reversibility that deserves attention. The RC is an economical capacity builder for the Total Force through both mobilization and intentional operational mission focus.
Historical Lessons
As Defense strategic guidance directs the former as the way ahead. 20 The limited nature of future conflicts requires strategic agility with respect to Reserve forces. The US must have the ability to change course in light of changes in the environment as the Defense strategic guidance directs. There are costs and risks associated with that capability.
The Resource Dilemma
The basic requirement is a good start to any dilemma regarding resources. This is especially true with a federal deficit in excess of $1 trillion. 21 The AC/RC balance is 
Future Requirements
The January 2012 Defense strategic guidance includes the following five major tenets: 1) rebalance force structure to the Pacific and Middle East while sustaining alliances elsewhere, 2) defeat an adversary in one theater while denying aggression on other fronts, 3) protect key investments in technology, 4) cease sizing active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations, and 5) restructure in a way that can reverse or regenerate capabilities if conditions change in the future. 22 The Joint Force 2020 defined the "far target" for force requirements, primarily in mission roles, which contains eight key elements: mission command; seize, retain and exploit the initiative; global agility; partnering; flexibility in establishing Joint Forces; cross-domain synergy;
use of flexible, low-signature capabilities; and increasing discrimination to minimize unintended consequences. 23 Lack of mention of the term "reserve" throughout the document is indicative of the mission focus of the concept, which is accomplished by 7 whichever component, Active, Reserve, or a mix, is suited for the job. Force structure composition must be intentional and programmed accordingly.
Current Reserve Force Structure
As of September 2010, the total Department of Defense (DOD) reserve was just over three million strong. Of that number, one-third of the force was ready reserve, which includes the selected reserve (SELRES), individual ready reserve (IRR) and inactive National Guard (ING). 24 The SELRES is the highest priority of reserve forces The concepts of "strategic reserve" and "operational reserve" have been popular topics throughout the Reserve in the past decade of sustained conflict. The RAND Corporation, in its monograph Rethinking the Reserves, defined the "strategic reserve" 8 as forces designed to meet strategic mission requirements with expected mobilization one time per generation. The "operational force," on the other hand, is expected to perform operational missions on a rotating basis. 27 The hallmark of force structure planning for the RC is ensuring requirements are filled with resources able to respond appropriately.
Current law allows the President to mobilize no more than 200,000 reserve members of the SELRES and IRR to active duty. 28 The 2012 National Defense There is more than one way to fulfill a requirement regardless of the task. This resource conundrum is no exception. The VUCA environment requires careful consideration and deliberate risk-taking to get the greatest return on the investment of precious taxpayer dollars for defense of the US. Reversibility is a conceptual framework that can help the DOD meet the requirements of this constrained environment.
Creating a Reversible Force Structure
The President's strategic guidance provides a discernible goal to planners and programmers given the responsibility of building a world class armed force with limited financial resources. Direction to "cease sizing active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations" implies the US armed forces will not be expected to remain in place for extended periods of time following hostilities. 32 Theoretically, this should reduce the overall need for rotational forces, though these type units certainly have great utility within the future RC force structure. The requirement to "restructure in a way that can reverse or regenerate capabilities" offers guidance directing force structure changes that can be easily reversed, if required. 33 As is typical of strategiclevel guidance, the President's emphasis points do not specify reversal/regeneration timeframes. Two separate capacity-building paths are best framed as immediate access for missions, such as those typically using low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) forces requiring frequent support, and requirements that can be delayed until programmatic changes in force structure take effect. sharing flying and maintenance duties of aircraft with an active duty unit. 39 The US Navy conducted its first integrated active-reserve deployment aboard the USS Gearing in 1971. 40 Increased capacity is inherently possible in these units with habitual, structured working relationships. Maintaining trained reserve personnel is the first part of the equation while the issues of funding and access must also be addressed to ensure successful capacity building capability.
For RC units and personnel to be accessible, the unit must be legally structured and funded in a way that enables that culture. Neither the current legal mobilization authority nor the basic funding for participation in the RC present a reserve force prepared for immediate response. There are sound reasons for these safeguards, and senior leaders must be intimately familiar with those reasons or risk losing trained Citizen Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen from the AVF.
One major factor is that participation expectations are based on selected service categories which Reservists normally select based on their particular circumstances.
Many Reservists have families and civilian jobs that, together with their part-time military obligations, form the "triad" many Reservists and Guardsmen balance every day. As these individuals mitigate tension in their lives, the DOD must also balance and seek efficiencies to maximize the scarce resources that the US Government will allocate.
Therefore, if the RC is to be used for immediate response, logic follows that laws and overall expectations must change with respect to increased participation, which will drive increased funding. continuously for an extended period of time and then "might be able to deploy immediately after that training." This method defeats the issue of training required for many RC forces prior to deployment. 42 The concept of association in which units share equipment could easily fit into this arrangement to provide a certain capacity for a specified period of time. Senior leaders and individual Service programmers and planners must ultimately consider the efficacy of using this force structure option on a case-by-case basis, if adopted. The long-term end of the reversibility spectrum takes a more calculated, measured method to build needed capacity programmatically when warranted. Previous large-scale US conflicts utilized the Selective Service system, at least in part, to build military capacity. However, the stated policy of the US Government is continued use of the AVF. 44 Historical examples, such as WWII, provide a precedent for successful programmatic force structure changes while simultaneously conducting
MCOs. The RAND concept of using cadre forces is a launching pad for a potential strategy in this arena:
When the reserves are used with rotation, some reserve forces are not used until six years after the beginning of a conflict. This is more than enough time to recruit and train new forces. As a result, it might be cheaper to create new forces when they are needed…rather than maintain forces in the reserves, for some cadre units, DOD might maintain only the leaders in the reserves, plus ability to rapidly recruit and train… 45 The six year timeframe presented in this example may be adequate for programming purposes; however, when training timelines are considered, the margin for error or variance narrows. Armed Services electing to plan and program to this concept must have outstanding corporate knowledge that fosters situational awareness concerning force structure capacity requirements. The RAND discussion conceded that there is not much solid data available on the cadre concept; nonetheless, it offered several critical touchstones required if the cadre concept has hope for success: 1) ability to recognize when long-term stability operations forces are needed, 2) "the authority to authorize the larger forces," and 3) the actual recruitment of the new forces. 46 These concerns for implementing the cadre concept are present in most organizational paradigm shifts. RAND did not provide extensive detail on whether AC or RC forces will "fill" the cadre units when required. The term "cadre component" was illdefined, though there is an implication that the cadre unit builds with AC forces. There was also an apparent conflict in whether the cadre manpower positions are AC or RC funded, but RAND acknowledged the cadre concept demands more study to determine its potential efficacy. 47 Even on the surface the utility and flexibility of this cadre concept are evident.
With an RC cadre, the costs associated with maintaining a training capacity are cut significantly. This is particularly helpful because the unit would be unproductive in its assigned unit mission since it is "skeletonized" with only a trained group of cadre members in funded manpower positions. Those cadre members could be mobilized or volunteer to "fill in" other unit gaps when needed. Optimally, "fill out" forces would be recruited or sourced from the AC.
Due to the expectation that these units would go into a stability operations rotation as soon as possible after reaching operating capability, there would be no inherent "discount" in building an RC force that would face immediate mobilization.
Moreover, AC forces are generally easier to involuntarily move between units, which would likely be a requirement once the demand for increased capacity subsided. The 16 trained AC forces could be moved to other units in need of personnel and the RC cadre would remain available for the next potential round of buildup. The cadre concept for programmatic capacity building is clearly a creative alternative to maintaining excess force structure that warrants further consideration.
Choices and Costs
Fiscal constraints drive change which often requires taking intentional risk. outweighs the concern over intra-component equality.
Funding this concept would also require additional baseline funding for increased minimum participation levels, though contingency funds would still be used for deployed funding. Revised Title 10 language would need to specifically address the additional workload required of the new participation category. Sixty to ninety additional active duty days were suggested by RAND in its study, but the law should also provide for fiscal relief to the DOD in the instance that additional capacity is not needed. There should also be a provision that permits DOD to waive the levels required for an effective recruiting and retention (R/R) year in this participation category if the RC is not needed. This is the exact opposite of the concept of mobilization; it is key for DOD to preserve resources while maintaining the capability to quickly reverse force structure capacity for LD/HD mission sets.
Programmatic Expansion Using Cadre Concept
The cadre concept could effectively generate force structure following programmatic response to a new MCO requirement. One great benefit is that the mechanisms currently exist. Conceptual culture changes and programmatic mechanisms are required to implement this course of action. The institutional forces for each Service must be prepared to recognize the need to fill the cadre units with trained forces when extended stability operations are anticipated. The authority to fund and hire additional forces would ideally come from existing processes in the DOD programming process.
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The primary question is manpower architecture for the cadre component. Placing the funded cadre positions in the "skeletonized" units with force positions remaining unfunded is one option. This structure negates the requirement for the institutional force to reprogram each time force structure capacity increases are required. However, this creates two potential resource drains: a potential requirement for overhead to support the cadre force, and the dilemma of how to best utilize a unit with no current mission.
One could argue that this construct is also inherently agile because these resources could be used as needed, even in missions such as Homeland Defense.
Using IMAs as cadre within an AC unit creates perhaps the greatest economy of scale. Not only would that Reservist cadre be available to train a new unit when called to do so, they would also be available as productive members of the AC unit when increased large-scale capacity was not needed. This augmentation actually creates a secondary mechanism of reversibility that could ease normal, smaller scale fluctuation periods in the AC. The downsides are that the programmed units would then need to include leadership positions in their structure; also, once IMAs shifted to cadre duties, they would no longer be available to the AC unit as capacity-builders. Those opportunity costs, however, are counterbalanced by the versatility provided by the continuous presence of Reservists in AC units. They would form an effective continuum of experience for the overall force.
Conclusion
The world rarely works in absolutes or extremes. The concept of reversibility is no different. In reality, the term reversibility is a word that was chosen to represent a concept important in framing Defense strategy. Expandability, capacity-building, and force regeneration are other terms that also fit the context presented in Defense 19 strategic guidance. The fiscal constraints currently facing the DOD demand a broad, flexible strategy to maintain a strategic military edge in a VUCA environment.
There is no reason to eliminate the use of rotational forces where consistent, predictable missions exist. In addition to the continued use of rotational reserve forces, the two capacity-building methods presented will serve the DOD as effective means to preserve capability and enable a reversal in force structure capacity when needed. The addition of a new participation status for immediate response in LD/HD missions will provide increased capacity at a reduced cost. On the other side of the coin, the cadre concept will enable efficient unit-level expansion when needed.
The diverse nature of the US military requires flexible programming opportunities.
Creative options are needed to provide Service staffs with choices that fit different mission sets. Successful implementation of the strategy to include two new RC force structure methodologies requires staff planners to accurately classify and program units.
A secondary requirement is that the programs must be executed with the intent to preserve resources. In general, a perpetually-mobilized RC is generally not more affordable than the AC per capita; it is nothing but an ad hoc AC. Programmatic and fiscal discipline will undoubtedly create a reversible, agile AC/RC force structure with unmatched capabilities to achieve the ends required by US Defense strategy.
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